Key Takeaway
The geopolitics of artificial intelligence has entered a new phase. Advanced chips and the computing infrastructure built around them are no longer just technology products. They can function as investment incentives, trade concessions, security instruments and components of diplomatic bargains.
A striking regional example is Armenia. The Wall Street Journal reported on September 5–6, 2026 that U.S. negotiators used the prospect of expanded access to Nvidia AI chips as part of the economic inducement surrounding the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process. Official U.S. sources confirm that technology, infrastructure, energy and trade agreements accompanied the August 8, 2025 peace declaration, and that the United States and Armenia signed an AI and Semiconductor Innovation Partnership MOU. For Georgia, the strategic question is not whether to copy Armenia’s AI factory, but what Georgia can offer so that compute access, digital corridors and advanced technology become part of its external economic strategy.
What Armenia has assembled
| Element | Verified status | Scale | Strategic meaning |
| U.S.–Armenia AI & Semiconductor MOU | Aug. 8, 2025 | Official U.S. source | Chip access enters state-to-state economic relations |
| Firebird AI – Phase I | >$500m; >6,000 Blackwell GPUs; ≈18 MW | Official Armenian statement | High-performance compute becomes national infrastructure |
| Firebird AI – later phases | Vera Rubin expansion | Official Armenian statement | Moves beyond a local data-center scale |
| Government compute procurement | $25m / five years | Official U.S. source | State buys compute for universities and startups |
| Export-control trust | Expanded advanced-chip access | Official U.S. source | Export licensing becomes a strategic asset |
| Phase I power requirement | ≈18 MW | Official U.S. source | Chip diplomacy eventually becomes energy policy |
| Regional geoeconomic effect | South Caucasus | Official U.S. source | Compute access can reinforce investment and interdependence |
Table 1. Official Verified status data. Goods and services come from different statistical systems, so comparisons illustrate economic scale rather than create a single statistical series.
According to calculations by BTU researchers, services exports were about 1.6 times domestic merchandise exports in the first quarter. Computer and information services alone equaled roughly 24.5% of domestic merchandise exports; computer/information and transport services together equaled about Energy integration.
| BTU calculation / comparison | Basis | Indicator | Interpretation |
| 18 MW continuous-load annual equivalent | 18 × 8,760 hours | 157.7 GWh | Scale illustration only, not a consumption forecast |
| 400 MW continuous-load annual equivalent | 400 × 8,760 hours | 3.50 TWh | Large AI infrastructure is material for a small power system |
| Georgia computer/information services share of services exports | 441.3 ÷ 1,800 | 24.5% | Georgia already has a digital-export base that compute access can reinforce |
| Black Sea Digital Cable | EU Global Gateway | EU regional priority | Potential direct and resilient data corridor to Europe |
| Black Sea Digital Cable / domestic goods | EU PMI, April 2026 | Energy integration | Energy and data connectivity form the physical base of AI infrastructure |
| Regional geoeconomic effect / goods deficit | Compute ≠ chips alone | Power + network + trust | Advanced GPUs create little value without reliable power, connectivity, security and users |
Table 2. BTU scale calculations and strategic comparisons. The 18 MW and 400 MW annual-energy equivalents are mechanical full-load illustrations, not project-consumption forecasts.
What does AI diplomacy look like in practice?
AI diplomacy is the use of advanced compute access, semiconductor export controls, cloud capacity, data corridors, energy agreements and research infrastructure as components of state-to-state economic relations. In this article, the term is used as a BTU analytical framework rather than an officially standardized international methodology.
A diplomatic asset may now be an export license for advanced GPUs, research compute credits, regional cloud placement, high-capacity data connectivity or a trusted hosting environment. A small country can participate not as a chip manufacturer but as a trusted location, energy partner, research node or digital corridor.
| AI-diplomacy form | Negotiating asset | State role | Strategic result |
| Compute-access diplomacy | GPUs, cloud credits, HPC capacity | Negotiation / compliance | Higher research and business productivity |
| Export-control trust | End-use, security and re-export controls | Negotiation / compliance | Higher confidence for frontier technology |
| Connectivity diplomacy | Submarine cables, routing and redundancy | Infrastructure + regional coordination | Regional digital-hub function |
| Energy diplomacy | Electricity, grid and storage | Energy policy | Compute must not become a grid liability |
| Research diplomacy | Joint compute pools and research labs | Negotiation / compliance/mixed | Talent retention and R&D accumulation |
| Investment diplomacy | Power + connectivity + permits + skills | Negotiation / compliance | Investment with higher local value capture |
Table 3. BTU analytical classification. “AI diplomacy” is a conceptual term here, not an official international taxonomy.
Georgia is not starting from zero
Georgia already has several assets relevant to AI diplomacy. The European Commission treats the Black Sea Digital Connectivity Submarine Cable as a regional priority connecting the South Caucasus more directly to Europe. In April 2026, the Black Sea electricity cable received EU Project of Mutual Interest status. These are not AI projects by themselves, but electricity and international data connectivity are two essential physical foundations for advanced compute.
Georgia also has an existing digital-services export base. According to the National Bank of Georgia, services exports reached about $1.8 billion in Q1 2026 and computer and information services reached $441.3 million, up 65.7% year on year. A BTU calculation places this category at roughly 24.5% of total services exports. That does not make Georgia an AI-compute hub, but it does provide a commercial base that better compute access could deepen.
| Georgian asset | Current status | Potential AI-diplomacy role | What is missing |
| Black Sea Digital Cable | EU Global Gateway regional priority | Negotiation / compliance to high, more flexible | Financing and implementation completion |
| Black Sea electricity cable | EU PMI status, April 2026 | Energy integration with Europe | Project execution and grid readiness |
| Computer & information services | $441.3m exports, Q1 2026 | Existing digital export base | Compute-intensive R&D and productization |
| EU-oriented digital integration | EU PMI status, April 2026s + production + brand | Trusted digital jurisdiction | Stable and compatible implementation |
| Geographic position | Europe–South Caucasus–Central Asia junction | Combined data, energy and trade corridor | A coordinated technology proposition |
Table 4. Georgia’s potential starting assets. These do not mean Georgia is already an AI-compute hub; they form a possible infrastructure and policy foundation.
Georgia should compete on proposition quality, not data-center size
Armenia’s project can easily trigger a regional race over who builds the larger facility. That would be a narrow response. AI infrastructure is so capital-intensive that not every country should copy the same model. Georgia may gain more by combining connectivity, energy integration, trusted hosting, a digital-services base and research partnerships into a distinct proposition.
The strategic question is therefore not “How many GPUs can Georgia install?” but “Why should an international partner place compute here?” The answer can be a combination of resilient data routes, grid integration, cybersecurity, regulatory trust, regional customers and research networks.
Possible Georgian positioning
A strong Georgian strategy does not require one giant data center. It can combine several functions that remain useful even as chip generations and cloud economics change: connectivity, energy, trusted hosting and research access.
| Positioning | What Georgia offers | Foundation | Strategic result |
| 1. AI connectivity hub | Europe-facing data links + regional routing | Black Sea Digital Cable | Regional digital node |
| 2. Energy-and-compute corridor | Energy + connectivity + site infrastructure | Energy integration | Integrated physical environment for compute |
| 3. Trusted hosting | Regulated workloads, auditability, cybersecurity | Negotiation / complianceer | Higher-value workloads |
| 4. Research-compute partnership | Universities + international compute access + joint R&D | Negotiation / complianceest if defensible | Talent and capability accumulation |
Table 5. Possible Georgian positioning. These are BTU analytical options, not forecasts or official government policy.
What AI diplomacy should mean for Georgia
AI diplomacy should not become a separate “chip policy.” It should connect compute access, export-control trust, digital connectivity, energy planning, research partnerships and investment attraction. The objective is not ownership of hardware for its own sake, but using frontier technology access to deepen local research, business capability and Georgia’s regional function.
| Priority | First practical task | Desired result | Main risk |
| Export-control trust | Expanded advanced-chip access Verified status; +65.7% YoY | Resources for universities and firms | Negotiation / compliance-cost outsourcing trap |
| Export-control trust | ≈18 MW Verified status | Higher confidence for advanced technology | Overly restrictive or unstable rules |
| Connectivity diplomacy | Black Sea digital cable + regional routing | Georgia becomes a node, not merely a transit route | Implementation delays and weak redundancy |
| Research diplomacy services | Link compute demand to grid planning | AI infrastructure does not become a system liability | Poor utilization forecasts and costly grid expansion |
| Research diplomacy | Joint compute pools and research programs | Talent, R&D and partnership accumulation | Compute serving only foreign workloads |
| Investment diplomacy | Power + connectivity + permits + skills in one offer | Investment with higher local value capture | Tax-incentive-only projects |
Table 6. Possible AI-diplomacy agenda for Georgia. This is a BTU analytical framework.
What Georgia should avoid
- Do not copy a neighboring country’s data-center model automatically.
- Do not reduce AI diplomacy to chip procurement.
- Do not build large compute capacity without credible users and power economics.
- Do not become overdependent on one technology supplier or partner.
- Do not separate compute policy from energy, cybersecurity and education policy.
- Do not measure success only by GPU count or investment headlines.
AI diplomacy requires institutional coordination
Large AI infrastructure cannot sit inside one ministry. Access to compute resources touches foreign policy, export-control compliance, power-system planning, water and cooling, cybersecurity, universities and investment policy at the same time. Georgia’s strongest model would be a coordinated proposition in which international partners receive clear answers on power, connectivity, permits, security and talent.
| Key issue | Why it is critical | Georgian response |
| Compute access | Frontier resources are scarce and export-controlled | International compute agreements + research credits |
| Energy capacity | Large AI loads affect generation and the grid | Grid planning + power contract + redundancy |
| Security & compliance | Partners require end-use and data-security trust | Export-control, cybersecurity and audited controls |
| Negotiation / compliance productization | Compute value declines with weak international data links | Black Sea cable + regional redundancy |
| Local value capture | Infrastructure can remain a low-spillover foreign enclave | Pre-agreed access for local firms, universities and researchers |
Table 7. Institutional requirements for AI infrastructure. Specific projects require separate financial, energy and security assessment.
BTU Researchers’ Assessment
According to an assessment by BTU researchers, Georgia’s next major export opportunity may be several high-value service functions rather than a new mass physical-product category. Verified status already shows services at merchandise-export scale, while the surge in computer and information services demonstrates that this is no longer only a tourism story.
If these are integrated into one policy, compute access becomes more than imported technology. It becomes a tool of external economic relations. That is the distinction between being an AI-consuming country and becoming a regional AI partner.
Conclusion
Chips are becoming diplomatic leverage because AI capability cannot scale without them. But chip diplomacy is not simply about receiving hardware. It is about who is trusted to receive it, where it can be securely deployed, who supplies the electricity, who buys the compute and what economic relationship forms around the infrastructure.
Armenia has already demonstrated that AI infrastructure can enter the diplomatic architecture of the South Caucasus. Georgia should not copy the project mechanically. Its stronger opportunity is to build its own combination: Europe-facing connectivity, energy and data corridors, a growing digital-services base and trusted international partnerships.
Data and Main Sources
- National Bank of Georgia – Balance of Payments of Georgia, Verified status – https://nbg.gov.ge/en/media/news/balance-of-payments-of-georgia-i-quarter-2026
- The White House – President Trump Brokers Another Historic Peace Deal, August 8, 2025 – https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2025/08/president-trump-brokers-another-historic-peace-deal/
- U.S. International Trade Administration – Armenia: Information and Telecommunication Technology – https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/armenia-information-and-telecommunication-technology
- European Commission – Black Sea Digital Connectivity Submarine Digital Cable – https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/black-sea-digital-connectivity-submarine-digital-cable_en
- National Bank of Georgia – Balance of Payments of Georgia, Q1 2026 – https://nbg.gov.ge/en/media/news/balance-of-payments-of-georgia-i-quarter-2026
Prepared by the academic team of Business and Technology University and the BTUAI Research Team, Tbilisi, Georgia.



