Brain Drain or Brain Circulation? – A New Portrait of Intellectual Migration in the South Caucasus

In the South Caucasus – Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan – migration has long been a defining theme. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, thousands have left their homelands due to economic crisis, political instability, and conflict. This gave rise to the concept of “brain drain” – when a country’s most educated and talented citizens emigrate and never return. Yet, in the 2020s, this picture is shifting. Increasingly, we hear of “brain circulation” – a process that implies not only one-way loss but two-way flows: remittances, the return of knowledge and contacts, business creation, and temporary repatriation.

This question is especially pressing today, as the region faces both demographic crisis and new economic opportunities. The key dilemma is: is the South Caucasus still a region of brain drain, or are circulatory mechanisms emerging that can turn emigration into a development resource?

Georgia provides a striking example, where the diaspora has become an economic lifeline. Nearly 23% of the population lives abroad, with the largest communities in Russia, Greece, and Italy. Their remittances form a cornerstone of the national economy: in 2023 they equaled 16.7% of GDP, while in 2024 they declined to 9.9%. But here lies the most intriguing part: the structure of remittances is changing. For years, Russia dominated as the main source, but now the European Union and the United States are taking the lead. In June 2025, Georgia recorded a historic peak – $315.5 million in a single month. Almost half came from Europe. Transfers from the United States alone reached $263 million in the first five months of 2025, a 20% increase compared to the previous year.

This proves that Georgian emigrants are now integrated into more diversified labor markets, reducing the country’s vulnerability to Russian economic shocks. But money alone is not enough. The IOM’s R-EMPOWER program is already working to reintegrate returnees, offering opportunities in education, employment, and entrepreneurship at the local level. Since 2003, more than 27,000 Georgians have returned, and about 7,000 have received reintegration support. Yet one challenge remains unsolved: how to retain highly skilled workers who often continue working for foreign companies even while physically based in Georgia.

In Armenia, the narrative of brain circulation is even stronger. The diaspora, at around seven million people, is nearly three times larger than the country’s resident population. Remittances reached $5.2 billion in 2022 and $5.7 billion in 2023, although they fell in 2024 due to banking restrictions. Yet Armenia turned this challenge into an opportunity. The iGorts program, which places diaspora professionals in government offices for one year, has shown impressive results – 70% of participants decided to stay in Armenia permanently, far above the original 25% target. The Neruzh startup initiative further encourages diaspora entrepreneurs by providing grants to launch tech ventures in Armenia.

One of the most dramatic shifts came after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when thousands of Russian IT companies relocated to Armenia. As a result, by 2024 the sector’s turnover reached $2.3 billion, and employment rose to 58,700. Armenian professionals still make up 81% of the workforce, proving that local resources are actively integrated into new structures. For Armenia, the diaspora is not just about money – it is an entire economic model, creating jobs, strengthening the technology sector, and bringing institutional knowledge back home.

In Azerbaijan, the picture is different. Around 11% of the population lives abroad, and remittances account for just 5% of GDP. The government has built a highly centralized diaspora system, including a State Committee, 12 coordinating councils, and a network of 560 organizations. Yet here, the focus is on financial flows rather than knowledge flows. Programs to bring back highly skilled professionals are limited. The flagship “Great Return” program is mainly aimed at repatriating internally displaced persons from Karabakh rather than attracting high-tech talent. Thus, the diaspora’s role remains more political and cultural than economic and innovative.

Looking across the region, the contrasts are clear. Armenia has leveraged its diaspora as a super-resource, with the tech boom serving as a vivid example. Georgia is building systematic reintegration programs, though it still struggles to anchor returning talent in its labor market. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, concentrates on demographics and infrastructure, but invests less in knowledge and innovation.

The South Caucasus no longer looks like a pure region of brain drain. A new trend is evident – circulation. Remittances are diversifying beyond Russia. Diaspora professionals are gradually engaging with state institutions and businesses. Local markets are beginning to benefit from new knowledge and technologies. Yet risks are equally visible. If domestic labor markets fail to become competitive, both returnees and newly trained professionals may leave again. And if the region’s countries compete for their own diasporas instead of cooperating, much of this shared resource could be lost.